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1. Federalism
Some see the EU as a primarily intergovernmental body; others prefer to view the EU institutions as forming a supranational entity with autonomous authority of its own. The “federal” form is then frequently discussed as one of a range of options within this supranationalist category.
Judge Koen Lenaerts of the European Communities Court of First Instance has argued that “federalism, as a means of structuring the relationship between interlinked authorities, can be used either within or without the framework of a nation-state.”(1) Used in this broader sense, federalism’s “basic tenet is that power will be divided between a central authority and the component entities of a nation-state or an international organization so as to make each of them responsible for the exercise of their own powers.'(2) Federalism searches for the balance between the desire to create and/or to retain an efficient central authority that can find its origin in historic, social, or other considerations, and the concern of the component entities to keep or gain their autonomy so that they can defend their own interests.
1.1 Federalism and the Federalists
The new federal state extends beyond the existing European Community and is both more binding and regulated in a formal constitutional and political sense than present organisational arrangements.
Terms like ‘unfinished’ or ‘incomplete’ union (3) are regularly used to portray it as somehow lacking in the essential qualities necessary to achieve the rank of being a normal state, a unitary state.
Viewed from the standpoint of federalism being described as a form of unitary government, it becomes literally alarming. It creates a direct attack upon the Community’s member states, pushing them, through increasing centralisation, assuredly towards a unitary end. One of the most difficult obstacles for federalists to overcome in their struggle to achieve political unification in Europe is this psychological perception of their intentions. It is made all the more difficult because of traditional state-building and national integration.
1.2 Federalism and the Single European Act, 1985-1987, Theoretical Implications – Spinelli
The federalism of Spinelli had as its main focus and goal the building of the European federation, based upon a federal constitution. “New European federation would be a state and states are notoriously resilient and tough in defence and promotion of their perceived interests.” (4)
At the level of European unification there are no examples in history for what Spinelli wanted to achieve. Well known fact is that the Union is only effective when it is achieved, that is, when it begins to safeguard interests on a European level previously assigned to the states. Only at this point does it connect directly with ordinary people’s daily lives.
1.3 Federal theory and EU
Although the study of federalism as a form of political organization has been a topic in political philosophy at least “since the publication of ‘Althusius’s Politica in 1603’, it was not until the creation of the United State that the conception of federalism as political community was established” (5). Federalism had been defined in terms of associations or groups of states each with a separate identity and distinct citizenry.
“Until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, few observers characterized the European Community (EC) as a federation. For although the Community had, by the late 1980s, acquired what looked like the institutional structure typical of a federal state, in practical terms it fell far short of meeting the minimal conditions for federation.”(6)
With the path of the SEA (Single European Act) it appeared to be moving towards a more federal-like structure. The main objective of the SEA was to create a single market and provide for the free movement of labour, goods, and capital among the member states, the Act also contained clear political objectives, which all pointed in the direction of building a federation rather than a loose community of states.
2. Power Federalism in Europe
“Power federalism doctrines hold that the central government simply lacks power to act in certain situations. 165 In the absence of such power, regulatory authority is reserved to the states. This, of course, is the basic structure established by Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which enumerates specific powers for Congress, and the Tenth Amendment, which clarifies that all power not enumerated is reserved to the People or to the States.” (7)
The doctrine of ‘dual federalism’ meant a system that divided the world into “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power-that of the national government and of the States. The two authorities confront each other as equals across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions.” (8)
The failure of dual federalism and the general American uneasiness about tests that more directly incorporate federalism values are all relevant to the issues currently confronting Europe.
2.1 Economic centralization to federal state
When countries come together voluntarily to form federations they do so for good practical, political reasons. In the European case, a group of neighbouring countries with a history of increasing co-operation in the context of the EC found it convenient to go one step further and form a political union because of the apparent advantages that union would bring in the shape of supranationally imposed macroeconomic discipline. The increased economic centralization which will likely result from the full implementation of EMU (European Monetary Union), will raise the government of the EU to that of a pseudo-federal state.
2.2 Policy and Party system (EU-USA)
The monetary union would trigger pressures for policy centralization which would in turn produce institutional change, but unlike the United States there is no federation-wide party system worthy of the name which would provide the newly powerful federal government with a base of popular support or legitimacy. Although theoretically such a party system could develop, such evidence as exists suggests that it is unlikely to. Two admittedly limited sources of evidence can be invoked to support this claim: the functioning of political parties in the existing EP and levels of public support for the EU and its policies.
3. Broader lessons
In this last part are outlined some broader speculations about the prospects for federalism in Europe and the lessons that Americans might draw from the European experience and the other way around.
3.1 What do we want federalism to do in a polity?
American federalism has prospered with a mix of extremely limited power federalism doctrines and a heavy reliance on process. Even without presuming to prescribe particular procedural structures for European federalism, one might be tempted to recommend the overall approach as a viable model for Europe. That would be a mistake, however, without taking stock of a more basic question: What do we want federalism to do in a polity?
First, we might want a strong principle of federalism that would maintain the states (or Member States) as culturally and politically autonomous units. A second, more modest vision would preserve some opportunity for cultural distinctiveness at the state level, while conceding that most citizens will think of themselves as citizens of the nation (or Union).
Although America has learned to live quite well with a more modest form of federalism, Europeans may want the strong form-at least for now. Larry Siedentop, for example, has urged that “the attraction of federalism, properly understood, for Europe is that it should make possible the survival of these different national political cultures and forms of civic spirit. “ (9) To the extent that Europe wants to preserve a strong form of Member State autonomy, the American experience is relevant primarily as a cautionary tale.
3.2 Europe, Federalism and Time
When people successfully live together under federalism they move freely from region to region; ethnic, cultural, and religious patterns become more diffuse. Certainly the barriers of language, the relative reluctance of citizens to move from one Member State to another, and the long traditions of each State as an independent nation would make the prospect of homogenization more remote. Notwithstanding determined efforts by European leaders, the sense of European identity which they hoped to encourage has been slow to evolve, despite the explosion of cross-border transactions and the turnover of generations. Even Americans tend to forget how diverse the American colonies were on the eve of nationhood.
3.3America’s Federal Conversation
American debates about federalism are fraught with political and historical baggage.
The cause of federalism is, after all, most prominently associated with slavery in the nineteenth century and massive resistance to desegregation in the twentieth.
European federalism surely has baggage of its own, but at least it is different baggage. David McKay has observed that “in the EU we have little reason to believe that the federal government’ will come to represent liberal progressive opinion battling against backward regressive states or groups of states. For the American observer, the shift in context may serve to shake up settled habits of thought about structural issues.” (10)
Americans have tended to view federalism as a zero-sum game, with sovereignty of the federal government trading off with that of the states. Relatively little attention has been paid to developing structures and approaches to federal action that would allow state governments to maximize the benefits of federal cooperation without simply turning over their policy concerns to Washington.
Europe is at a far different place in history than America, and that difference has profound implications for the role of supranational regimes. The important point for present purposes is simply that the federal experience is a two-way street: Americans may well have just as much to learn from Europe as Europeans can learn from us. Given increasing pressure on the already modest American guarantees of state autonomy, those lessons may prove invaluable in years to come.
Conclusion
Europe appears to be moving toward an ever-closer Union while Europeans retain substantial attachments to their Member States. In America, there is a 200-year-old constitutional structure whose basic outlines are relatively fixed but which must be made to work despite radical shifts in economic relationships, technology, and the nature and functions of government. Europeans, on the other hand, have both the luxury and the challenge afforded by a system that is still very much in the making; they have, in other words, an opportunity to design a structure of constitutional federalism in light of contemporary challenges and experience.
Europeans are thus in a position to profit from the experience and the mistakes-of others. In any event, the basic point is that federal systems can smooth over-or fight through quite profound cultural and political differences over the course of a couple centuries.
1 – “United States of Europe” – Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution – the case of the European Union, 21 Fordham INT L.J. 746,747 (1998)
2 – T. Koopmans, Federalism: the wrong debate, 29 Common Mkt. 1047, 1050 (1992)
3 – Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union, Routledge London and New York, 1989
4 – Ever closer Union (European perspectives series, Brussels, 1985)
5- Federalism in theory and practice, London, Pall Mall Press, 1968, ch.2
6 – David McKay, Federalism and European Union, A political economy perspective, Oxford press, 1999
7 – Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev., 1, 26-29
8 – Federalism: Historic Questions and Contemporary Meanings, 25-25, Valerie Earle ed. , 1968
9 – Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 70-71 (2001)
-10 – David McKay, Federalism and European union, A political economy perspective, O
governments in the role of Pinocchio, and the whistleblowers in the role of the truth tellers. This is a simple story of the well-known wooden puppet which is predisposed to telling lies and fabricating stories for numerous reasons. However, there was one obstacle to telling lies, which was the nose that extends quite far when a lie was being told. So each time the nose became long enough to poke a truth teller, Pinocchio’s lies were being exposed to the public.
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